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The present research explored the role of the medial temporal lobes in object memory in unique 44 
patient MR, who has a selective lesion to her left lateral entorhinal cortex. Two experiments 45 
explored recognition memory for object identity and object location in  MR and matched 46 
Controls. The results showed that MR had intact performance in an object location task (MR = 47 
.70, Controls = .69, t(6) = .06, p > .05), but was impaired in an object identity task (MR = .62, 48 
Controls = .84, t(6) = -4.12, p < .05). No differences in correct recollection or familiarity 49 
emerged. These results suggest a differential role of the entorhinal cortex in object recognition 50 
memory. The current research is therefore the first patient study to demonstrate the role of the 51 
lateral entorhinal cortex in object identity recognition and suggests that current medial temporal 52 
lobe theoretical models concerning both object and recognition memory need a theoretical re-53 
think to account for the contributions of the entorhinal cortex in these processes.  54 
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Introduction 69 
A current issue within cognitive neuropsychological research concerns the role of the 70 
medial temporal lobes in both memory and perception. Mnemonic-perceptual theories have 71 
suggested that the medial temporal lobes are involved in both these processes, with the 72 
perirhinal cortex responsible for object identity recognition and the hippocampus being 73 
interested in spatial perception [1], [2]. However, the role of the entorhinal cortex, which is 74 
situated between the hippocampus and perirhinal cortex, in both object recognition and spatial 75 
perception remains little understood. This is partly due to the complete lack thus far of patients 76 
with damage focal to the entorhinal cortex. Hence the present research aims to shed light onto 77 
the role of the entorhinal cortex in these processes in a unique patient MR, who has a selective 78 
lesion to her left entorhinal cortex. 79 
 80 
Regarding object recognition, the two streams hypothesis proposes that different and 81 
distinct ‘what’ and ‘where’ pathways exist in the brain [3], [4]. Part of these ‘what’ and ‘where’ 82 
streams ultimately reach the medial temporal lobes, where the information they contain is 83 
bound into a single, unified representation by the hippocampus [5]. Although these ‘what’ and 84 
‘where’ streams are initially perceptual, it is believed that they become endowed with 85 
mnemonic information as they enter the medial temporal lobes. Given the location of the 86 
entorhinal cortex between the perirhinal cortex and the hippocampus, it has been speculated 87 
that this area may also be involved in perceptual-mnemonic processes [6]. Relatedly, 88 
subdivisions may also exist within the entorhinal cortex, where the lateral part has a 89 
visuoperceptual role and the medial part has a visuospatial role [7], [8]. Furthermore, it has 90 
been found that lateralisation occurs for object encoding such that object identity encoding was 91 
lateralised left, while spatial encoding was lateralised right within the medial temporal lobes 92 
[9], [10]. 93 
 94 
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 As well as having a role in perception, the medial temporal lobes also underpin 95 
recognition memory and the subjective experiences which accompany successful retrieval, 96 
namely recollection and familiarity, or ‘remembering’ and ‘knowing’. Recollection involves 97 
the retrieval of contextual information whereas familiarity is acontextual retrieval. Although 98 
there is dispute whether these processes are independent or not, the evidence for these being a 99 
dual process is strong at the brain level. Compelling fMRI evidence has demonstrated that the 100 
hippocampus underpins recollection whereas the perirhinal cortex supports familiarity [5], 101 
[11]. Patient studies have also been invaluable in supporting the dual-process model in finding 102 
a clear double dissociation between remembering and knowing. [12 - 15].  103 
 104 
At present, there has been no specific role suggested for the entorhinal cortex in any 105 
theoretical recognition memory models, although recent research in healthy adults has 106 
suggested that this area has a selective role in familiarity rather than recollection-based 107 
judgements [13]. Recent research on patient MR, who has a selective lesion to her left 108 
entorhinal cortex, demonstrated impaired familiarity for words but performed normally in the 109 
recognition of non-words and faces [14]. Additionally, her recollection was unimpaired across 110 
these entire stimuli. Relatedly, recent research [15] has explored these processes in relation to 111 
material type in the medial temporal lobes, finding that the rhinal cortices responded 112 
preferentially to object familiarity, but not to scenes or faces, whilst the hippocampus was not 113 
material-specific but did respond to recollection for all category types. The aims of the present 114 
research are therefore to investigate the role of the entorhinal cortex in object recognition and 115 
associated subjective experiences, in MR and her Control group. 116 
 117 
Method 118 
The research gained ethical approval from the National Research Ethics Service and the 119 
University of Roehampton Ethics Committee. All participants, including MR, gave written 120 
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informed consent. MR and eight Controls took part in the research. Control participants were 121 
healthy females, all of whom had fluent English and were matched to MR on handedness, age, 122 
years of education and a range of neuropsychological intelligence profiling, as detailed in 123 
previous research [14]. All measures were tested using Crawford’s modified t-test, which is 124 
suitable for single case studies with a small control group [16] and all p > .05. Participants were 125 
given monetary compensation for their travel and participation.  126 
 127 
Patient MR 128 
MR’s clinical profile is more fully described elsewhere [14]. Briefly, she is a right-129 
handed female who was 51 years old at the time of testing. At the age of 36 she began to 130 
experience seizures, and MRI investigations identified a small cavernoma on her left 131 
parahippocampal gyrus. To localise the lesion in relation to the entorhinal cortex, coronal 132 
images were compared with published references to the delineation of the entorhinal cortex 133 
[17] and, to exclude any atrophy of the mesial temporal structures, automated volumetric 134 
assessment was performed according to previously described methods [18]. This found that the 135 
volumes of MRs medial temporal lobes are in-line with aged-matched Controls and, despite 136 
her cavernoma, there is no atrophy present in this area. Imaging analysis was only performed 137 
for MR and is shown in Figure 1.  138 
 139 
Experiment 1: object identity 140 
Participants gave written informed consent and were given a verbal description of the 141 
experiment. Then, they were trained on the remember/know/guess paradigm, using instructions 142 
closely modelled on previous work [19]. This experiment was designed to explore object 143 
identity memory by manipulating the identity of objects from scenes. A practice block using 144 
stimuli from the SUN database [20] was given to participants so they could familiarise 145 
themselves with the demands of the experiment and to ensure they fully understood the method. 146 
 8 
 
After finishing, participants were given the opportunity to ask any questions before proceeding 147 
to the experiment proper.  148 
 149 
Here, memory was tested for objects embedded in different 48 3D scenes adapted from 150 
previous work [21]. Each scene was visually rich in colour, with shadows and lighting detail. 151 
All scenes depicted a real-life environment, e.g. a kitchen. In a trial, participants were shown a 152 
fixation cross for 1000ms before being shown a scene for 10 seconds, followed by a pattern 153 
mask of patchwork colours for 200ms. Following this scene presentation, an object was then 154 
presented centrally on an olive-green background. In half of the trials, this object was taken 155 
from the initial scene (true trial), and in the other half the object was not present in the initial 156 
scene (false trial). False trials used objects picked from the same practice trials of previous 157 
research [21], which were not used in the present experiment. Participants were asked to decide 158 
if the object was in the scene or not. If they agreed, they were then asked to make a 159 
remember/know/guess decision. If the participant initially indicated that the object was not in 160 
the scene, then the experiment skipped to the next trial. Presentation of trials was randomised 161 
and responses were collected via keyboard. After the experiment was completed, participants 162 
were fully debriefed, thanked for their time, paid and dismissed. 163 
 164 
Experiment 2: object location 165 
The procedure was almost identical to that of Experiment 1 and took place on average 166 
almost 4 weeks after Experiment 1. However now, rather than the target object being presented 167 
in the centre of the screen, a true object’s location was manipulated. Again, half of the trials 168 
were true (the object is presented in the same location as it was in the initial scene) and half 169 
false (the object is moved to a false alarm position.). Only the location of the object was 170 
manipulated in the present experiment to ensure that this task was only exploring object-171 
location memory. Other than this manipulation, the trials were virtually the same as described 172 
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in the object identity experiment. Participants were asked ‘Was this object located here in the 173 
scene?’, where key presses indicated a yes/no, and asked if they remember / know / guess if 174 
they answered ‘yes’. The debrief, payment, thanking and dismissal was the same as previously. 175 
 176 
Results 177 
One participant was excluded from both experiments for floor performance. Results 178 
from the two experiments were analysed using the proportion of hits minus false alarms for 179 
overall recognition, remember, and know responses. Guesses were too low to analyse but all 180 
subjective measure results are included in Table 1. All results were analysed using Crawford’s 181 
modified t-test [16]. In line with other similar patient research [22], remember responses acted 182 
as an index of recollection, while a correction of independence was applied to know responses 183 
[F = K(1-R)] in order to get an estimate of familiarity [23]. This correction of independence 184 
assumes that recollection and familiarity are distinct, where recollection is proposed to be a 185 
categorical threshold process, while familiarity is a continuous signal-detection process [24]. 186 
These data were also analysed without the correction of independence (hits minus false alarms).  187 
  188 
Experiment 1: object identity 189 
 Three trials were excluded from the analysis as the objects chosen may have been 190 
semantically linked to their respective scene, for example, a living room scene which contained 191 
a lamp had a different lamp shown as the false alarm object, which could therefore have raised 192 
the false alarm rate. All analyses are two-tailed unless otherwise stated.  193 
 194 
 The analysis on overall recognition performance (hits-false alarms) found that MR was 195 
significantly impaired in comparison to Controls (MR = .62, Controls = .84, t(6) = -4.12, p < 196 
.05, one-tailed). Additionally, analysing overall recognition memory using d’, based on signal 197 
detection theory [25], showed that MR was also impaired when compared to Controls (t(6) = -198 
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3.11, p < .05). MR’s response criterion was measured using the criterion location measure (C) 199 
[14], which revealed that MR had no shift in response criterion when compared to Controls 200 
(t(6) = 1.03, p > .05). Further analyses revealed no significant differences in recollection (MR 201 
= .58, Controls = .63, t(6) = -.29, p > .05), nor in familiarity (MR = .10, Controls = .30, t(6) = 202 
-.75, p > .05, one-tailed). 203 
 204 
Given MR’s impairment in overall recognition performance, separate analyses on hits 205 
and false alarms were carried out to determine where the nature of her impairment was located. 206 
These analyses found that, in terms of hits, MR was impaired in overall recognition (MR = .67, 207 
Controls = .86, t(6) = -2.96, p < .05) but performed within normal range for recollection (MR 208 
= .63, Controls = .64, t(6) = -.06, p > .05) and familiarity (MR = .11, Controls = .30, t(6) = -209 
.71, p > .05, one-tailed). The analyses on overall false alarms showed no differences between 210 
MR and the Controls (MR = .05, Controls = .02, t(6) = .94, p > .05), nor were any differences 211 
found for recollection (MR = .05, Controls = .01, t(6) = 1.87, p > .05), and neither group made 212 
any false know responses, hence familiarity rates are not calculated. 213 
 214 
Experiment 2: object location 215 
One trial was excluded from analysis as the location of the object coincided where a 216 
similar object was in the original scene. Analysis was the same as described in Experiment 1. 217 
The results revealed that there were no significant differences between MR and the Controls 218 
for overall recognition memory, (MR = .70, Controls = .69, t(6) = .06, p > .05). Her d’ score 219 
was also normal in this task when compared to Controls (t(6) = -.30, p > .05), as was her C 220 
score (t(6) = -1.09, p > .05). However, MR had significantly lower recollection compared to 221 
Controls, (MR = .33, Controls = .52, t(6) = -2.54, p < .05). There were no significant difference 222 
between MR and the Controls for the measure of familiarity (MR = .43, Controls = .25, t(6) = 223 
.77, p > .05). 224 
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 225 
Given MR’s impairment for overall remember responses, separate analyses on hits and 226 
false alarms were carried out in order to explore this further. For hits, the analysis found that 227 
MR was within normal range for recollection responses (MR = .42, Controls = .54, t(6) = -228 
1.40, p > .05) and familiarity (MR = .50, Controls = .33, t(6) = 1.14, p > .05). Analysis of false 229 
alarms found that MR’s overall scores were normal (MR = .13, Controls = .07, t(6) = .80, p > 230 
.05), although the analysis revealed that MR gave significantly more false recollection 231 
responses (MR = .09, Controls = .02), t(6) = 3.27, p < .05) but had normal levels of false 232 
familiarity (MR = 0, Controls = .03, t(6) = -.56, p > .05). 233 
 234 
 Discussion 235 
The aim of the present research was to explore the role of the left entorhinal cortex in 236 
object recognition. The findings demonstrated that MR was impaired in recognising an object’s 237 
identity, but had normal object location memory. The remaining results found that MR 238 
generally performed similarly to the Controls in terms of recollection and familiarity, although 239 
she did report significantly more false remember responses in the Where experiment. Her 240 
impairment therefore primarily only affects object identity recognition, while her spatial 241 
memory is spared. 242 
 243 
Perceptual-mnemonic theories would suggest that the perirhinal cortex underpins 244 
object perception, whereas the hippocampus underpins spatial perception [1], [2]. As far as the 245 
authors are aware, no such perceptual-mnemonic theory has yet formally suggested a role of 246 
the entorhinal cortex in object processing, although there is existing neuroimaging evidence on 247 
healthy participants suggesting that it does have a role to play in object processing [9]. More 248 
recent work using a higher strength scanner has also broadly supported this notion [8], although 249 
the precise nature of the human entorhinal cortex has yet to be fully understood. Lastly, 250 
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research has found that object identity and object location processing is lateralised to the left 251 
and right hemispheres, respectively [9 - 10]. Taken together, these findings on healthy 252 
participants strongly suggest that the entorhinal cortex has a role in object perception. 253 
Moreover, the present patient research implicates the entorhinal cortex as being part of the 254 
‘what’ pathway, thus extending research on patients with perirhinal cortex damage who have 255 
been found to be impaired in recognising an object’s identity. Furthermore, this result is 256 
supported by MR’s imaging that demonstrates she has no atrophy within this area and that there 257 
are no volumetric differences within her medial temporal lobe regions compared to age-258 
matched Controls. As her impairment can be confidently deduced to the cavernoma on the 259 
lateral part of her left entorhinal cortex, this strongly suggests that this area is integral for object 260 
identity recognition.  261 
 262 
 The present research explores the first single case study on a patient with a selective 263 
lesion to the left entorhinal cortex in object recognition memory. Such populations offer 264 
obvious localisation of function advantages in memory research, although caution must be 265 
taken not to over-interpret the present findings. Further investigation is required to solidify the 266 
role of the entorhinal cortex. For example, it would be of interest to see how a patient with a 267 
lesion to their right entorhinal cortex might perform in these object memory tasks, as this would 268 
shed light on whether the crux of MR’s object identity impairment is due to verbal labelling 269 
processes that are left-dominant. A patient with such damage may therefore be unimpaired as 270 
MR’s performance suggests that object recognition is resolved by the left, and not the right, 271 
hemisphere.  272 
 273 
In sum, the present research has demonstrated for the first time a unique relationship 274 
between the entorhinal cortex and object identity but not object location memory. Furthermore, 275 
given the generally normal correct recollection and familiarity levels demonstrated in patient 276 
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MR, our results suggest that the role the entorhinal cortex has to play in object identity 277 
recognition is based mainly on quantitative aspects of recognition memory. Furthermore, this 278 
appears to be restricted to the lateral part of the left entorhinal cortex. These findings suggest a 279 
theoretical re-think of the role of the entorhinal cortex in mnemonic-perceptual accounts of the 280 
medial temporal lobes. 281 
 282 
 283 
 284 
 285 
 286 
 287 
 288 
 289 
 290 
 291 
 292 
 293 
 294 
 295 
 296 
 297 
 298 
 299 
 300 
 301 
 302 
 14 
 
Acknowledgements – We are grateful to MR for her very willing cooperation and interest in 303 
our research.  304 
 305 
 306 
 307 
 308 
 309 
 310 
 311 
 312 
 313 
 314 
 315 
 316 
 317 
 318 
 319 
 320 
 321 
 322 
 323 
 324 
 325 
 326 
 327 
 328 
 15 
 
References 329 
[1] K. S. Graham, M. D. Barense, and A. C. H. Lee, “Going beyond LTM in the MTL: a 330 
synthesis of neuropsychological and neuroimaging findings on the role of the medial 331 
temporal lobe in memory and perception.,” Neuropsychologia, vol. 48, no. 4, pp. 831–332 
53, Mar. 2010. 333 
[2] A. C. H. Lee, M. D. Barense, and K. S. Graham, “The contribution of the human 334 
medial temporal lobe to perception: bridging the gap between animal and human 335 
studies.,” Q. J. Exp. Psychol. B., vol. 58, no. 3–4, pp. 300–25, 2005. 336 
[3] M. a Goodale and  a D. Milner, “Separate visual pathways for perception and action.,” 337 
Trends Neurosci., vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 20–5, Jan. 1992. 338 
[4] M. Mishkin, L. G. Ungerleider, and K. A. Macko, “Object vision and spatial vision : 339 
two cortical pathways,” pp. 414–417, 1983. 340 
[5] R. a Diana, A. P. Yonelinas, and C. Ranganath, “Imaging recollection and familiarity 341 
in the medial temporal lobe: a three-component model.,” Trends Cogn. Sci., vol. 11, 342 
no. 9, pp. 379–86, Sep. 2007. 343 
[6] B. A. Kent, M. Hvoslef-Eide, L. M. Saksida, and T. J. Bussey, “The representational–344 
hierarchical view of pattern separation: Not just hippocampus, not just space, not just 345 
memory?,” Neurobiol. Learn. Mem., 2016. 346 
[7] Z. M. Reagh and M. a Yassa, “Object and spatial mnemonic interference differentially 347 
engage lateral and medial entorhinal cortex in humans.,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. 348 
A., Sep. 2014. 349 
[8] H. Schultz, T. Sommer, and J. Peters, “The Role of the Human Entorhinal Cortex in a 350 
Representational Account of Memory,” vol. 9, no. November, pp. 1–8, 2015. 351 
[9] P. S. F. Bellgowan, E. a Buffalo, J. Bodurka, and A. Martin, “Lateralized spatial and 352 
object memory encoding in entorhinal and perirhinal cortices.,” Learn. Mem., vol. 16, 353 
no. 7, pp. 433–8, Jul. 2009. 354 
 16 
 
[10] W. M. Kelley, F. M. Miezin, K. B. Mcdermott, R. L. Buckner, M. E. Raichle, N. J. 355 
Cohen, J. M. Ollinger, E. Akbudak, T. E. Conturo, A. Z. Snyder, and S. E. Petersen, 356 
“Hemispheric Specialization in Human Dorsal Frontal Cortex and Medial Temporal 357 
Lobe for Verbal and Nonverbal Memory Encoding,” vol. 20, pp. 927–936, 1998. 358 
[11] A. P. Yonelinas, “The Nature of Recollection and Familiarity: A Review of 30 Years 359 
of Research,” J. Mem. Lang., vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 441–517, Apr. 2002. 360 
[12] K. R. Brandt, J. M. Gardiner, F. Vargha-Khadem, A. D. Baddeley, and M. Mishkin, 361 
“Impairment of recollection but not familiarity in a case of developmental amnesia.,” 362 
Neurocase, vol. 15, no. 1, pp. 60–5, 2008. 363 
[13] A. de Vanssay-Maigne, M. Noulhiane, A. D. Devauchelle, S. Rodrigo, S. Baudoin-364 
Chial, J. F. Meder, C. Oppenheim, C. Chiron, and F. Chassoux, “Modulation of 365 
encoding and retrieval by recollection and familiarity: mapping the medial temporal 366 
lobe networks.,” Neuroimage, vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 1131–8, Oct. 2011. 367 
[14] K. R. Brandt, M. W. Eysenck, M. K. Nielsen, and T. J. von Oertzen, “Selective lesion 368 
to the entorhinal cortex leads to an impairment in familiarity but not recollection,” 369 
Brain Cogn., vol. 104, pp. 82–92, 2016. 370 
[15] A. Kafkas, E. M. Migo, R. G. Morris, M. D. Kopelman, D. Montaldi, and A. R. 371 
Mayes, “Material specificity drives medial temporal lobe familiarity but not 372 
hippocampal recollection,” Hippocampus, vol. 209, pp. 1–20, 2016. 373 
[16] J. R. Crawford and D. C. Howell, “Comparing an Individual ’ s Test Score Against 374 
Norms Derived from Small Samples *,” vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 482–486, 1998. 375 
[17] R. Insausti, K. Juottonen, H. Soininen,  A. M. Insausti, K. Partanen, P. Vainio, M. P. 376 
Laakso, and  a Pitkänen, “MR volumetric analysis of the human entorhinal, perirhinal, 377 
and temporopolar cortices.,” AJNR. Am. J. Neuroradiol., vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 659–71, 378 
Apr. 1998. 379 
[18] H. J. Huppertz, J. Kröll-Seger, S. Klöppel, R. E. Ganz, and J. Kassubek, “Intra- and 380 
 17 
 
interscanner variability of automated voxel-based volumetry based on a 3D 381 
probabilistic atlas of human cerebral structures,” Neuroimage, vol. 49, no. 3, pp. 2216–382 
2224, 2010. 383 
[19] S. Rajaram, “Remembering and knowing: two means of access to the personal past.,” 384 
Mem. Cognit., vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 89–102, Jan. 1993. 385 
[20] J. Xiao, J. Hays, K. A. Ehinger, and A. Torralba, “SUN database : Large-scale scene 386 
recognition from abbey to zoo,” IEEE Conf., 2010. 387 
[21] A. Hollingworth, “The relationship between online visual representation of a scene and 388 
long-term scene memory.,” J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn., vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 389 
396–411, May 2005. 390 
[22] B. Bowles, C. Crupi, S. M. Mirsattari, S. E. Pigott, A. G. Parrent, J. C. Pruessner, A. P. 391 
Yonelinas, and S. Köhler, “Impaired familiarity with preserved recollection after 392 
anterior temporal-lobe resection that spares the hippocampus.,” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 393 
U. S. A., vol. 104, no. 41, pp. 16382–7, Oct. 2007. 394 
[23] A. P. Yonelinas and L. L. Jacoby, “Dissociating automatic and controlled processes in 395 
a memory-search task: Beyond implicit memory,” Psychol. Res., vol. 57, no. 3–4, pp. 396 
156–165, 1995. 397 
[24] A. P. Yonelinas and L. L. Jacoby, “The process-dissociation approach two decades 398 
later: convergence, boundary conditions, and new directions.,” Mem. Cognit., vol. 40, 399 
no. 5, pp. 663–80, Jul. 2012. 400 
[25] J. G. Snodgrass and J. Corwin, “Pragmatics of measuring recognition memory: 401 
applications to dementia and amnesia.,” J. Exp. Psychol. Gen., vol. 117, no. 1, pp. 34–402 
50, 1988. 403 
 404 
 405 
 406 
 18 
 
Figures and tables (to be inserted by journal) 407 
Table 1.  408 
Proportion of hits and false alarms for MR and Controls as a function of experiment type. 409 
 410 
 Hits  False alarms 
 Remember Know Guess  Remember Know Guess 
Exp. 1:         
MR .63 .04 0  .05 0 0 
Controls .64 (.16) .13 (.15) .10 (.06)  .01 (.02) 0 (0) .01 (.02) 
Exp. 2:        
MR .42 .29 .13  .09 0 .04 
Controls .54 (.08) .15 (.07) .08 (.08)  .02 (.02) .03 (.05) .02 (.03) 
 411 
Note. Standard deviations in parentheses 412 
 413 
 414 
 415 
 416 
 417 
 418 
 419 
 420 
 421 
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 422 
 423 
Figure 1. T2-weighted coronal imaging of MRs cavernoma (white arrow, EC = entorhinal 424 
cortex; CS = collateral sulcus). Orientation of the coronal images is perpendicular to the 425 
longitudinal axis of the hippocampus and slice thickness is 2 mm. Following previous protocol 426 
[17], this series of images shows the landmarks used to identify the hippocampal and rhinal 427 
cortical areas. It would appear that MR’s cavernoma and its surrounding hemosiderin halo 428 
(surrounding susceptibility artefact = black) covers the lateral part of the left entorhinal cortex, 429 
as in [7]. 430 
 431 
